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The dispute resolution procedures of the World Trade Organization allow sanctions 
to be imposed when a country is unwilling to bring a WTO-inconsistent trade 
measure into conformity. Apart from the fact that the procedure for triggering the 
retaliation process has ambiguities that need to be removed, the retaliation itself has 
some undesirable economic features. This paper looks at why compensation is not 
preferred to retaliation and then examines five economic features of the temporary 
trade retaliation that WTO may permit under certain conditions. Both efficiency and 
equity concerns are raised. The paper concludes with some suggestions for 
reforming this part of WTO dispute resolution during the review of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding that is due to be completed by May 2003.  
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One of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations was the creation in the new World Trade Organization of a much-
enhanced dispute settlement mechanism.
1 Known formally as the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (WTO 1995), this body 
of international trade law raised great expectations of much more definitive and 
speedier resolution of trade disputes than under the law of the original General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Even so, the possibility remains that a 
WTO member found to have WTO-inconsistent policies may choose not to reform 
those policies enough to satisfy complainants. If in that case a WTO Panel finds the 
new policies still inconsistent with WTO rules, the complainant country is entitled to 
compensation. Should an agreement on compensation not be forthcoming there is 
provision, in Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), for the 
complainant to retaliate against the respondent. If the extent of retaliation is not agreed 
between the parties, an arbitrator will determine the amount. The first two uses of that 
provision were in the late 1990s (bananas and beef hormones) and involved the two 
largest WTO members: the United States, as one of the complainants, and the 
European Communities, as respondent.
2 
This provision to retaliate and the rules for doing so involve an apparent 
procedural dilemma as well as some peculiar economic features. Now is the time to 
reconsider those features of the rules, because the DSU has been under review as part 
of the Uruguay Round’s built-in agenda and is now also part of the multilateral trade 
                                                           
1 Jackson (1998, p.176) went so far as to claim that the establishment of the Dispute Settlement Body in 
the WTO “is likely to be seen in the future as one of the most important, and perhaps even watershed, 
developments of international economic relations in the twentieth century”.   
2 There were no GATT-authorized retaliatory measures imposed during the 47 years prior to the 
formation of the WTO in 1995. In the one case where it was authorized, for the Netherlands in 1952, 
the authorized quota was never put in place (Valles and McGiven 2000, p. 77).  2
negotiations launched in Doha in November 2001, which involves a commitment to 
reach agreement on DSU improvements and clarifications no later than May 2003.  
The present paper discusses first the apparent dilemma in the procedure for 
triggering the retaliation process, then asks why compensation is not preferred to 
retaliation, and then examines five economic features of retaliation. Those features are 
the concept of equivalence, the inherent injustices that remain, the choice of 
counterfactual to the WTO-inconsistent regime, the appropriate breadth of coverage in 
the damage calculations, and the cross-retaliation issue. The paper then points to the 
complications that globalization is adding to trade dispute resolution. Some 
implications for reforming the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures are drawn out in 
the final section. 
 
1. The problem with the triggering process 
If a WTO dispute settlement Panel or the WTO Appellate Body finds a 
member’s trade policy to be not in conformity with WTO rules and the member’s 
commitments, a ‘reasonable period of time’ is allowed for the policy to be brought 
into conformity (DSU Article 21.3). In practice this period has ranged from three to 15 
months. If the policy is not changed, consultations between the complainant and 
respondent members should begin before that time period expires, with a view to 
establishing mutually acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory agreement is 
reached within 20 days after expiry of the ‘reasonable period of time’, the 
complainant(s) can request authorization from the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) to ‘suspend concessions’, that is, to retaliate (DSU Article 22.2).  
Unless there is a consensus not to, the DSB will grant that authority, and 
within 30 days after expiry of the reasonable period of time. Should the respondent  3
object to the amount of retaliation proposed by the complainant, the matter is referred 
to an Arbitrator for a decision within 60 days after expiry of the reasonable period of 
time (DSU Article 22.6). The task of the Arbitrator (where possible the original Panel 
that ruled on the WTO inconsistency in the first place) is to decide whether the level 
of retaliation proposed is ‘equivalent’ to the level of damage (‘nullification or 
impairment’). That decision by the Arbitrator is final: there is no appeal option or 
opportunity to seek a second arbitration. The DSU will accept the decision and grant 
authorization for retaliation, again unless there is a consensus not to (DSU Article 
22.7). 
Straightforward as that procedure may seem, it hides an apparent dilemma in 
the DSU. Suppose the respondent takes the full ‘reasonable period of time’ before 
announcing a reform of the offending policy measure. If the complainant believes the 
reform is insufficient to make the policy WTO consistent, it has the opportunity to 
refer the matter to a Panel (again, preferably the original one). The Panel in turn must 
report within 90 days of that request (DSU Article 21.5). If the respondent is unhappy 
with the Panel’s ruling, another 45 days could be required for the Appellate Body to 
consider the matter. The apparent dilemma is that even if the Panel or Appellate Body 
find the reformed policy still WTO-inconsistent, the 20 days after the ‘reasonable 
period of time’ for a complainant to lodge a request to retaliate will have expired. This 
interpretation of DSU Articles 21.5 and 22 suggests there could be an endless loop of 
litigation.  
An alternative interpretation is provided by Mavroidis (2000, pp. 795-99). He 
argues (a) that Article 22.2 includes the possibility that the losing party does 
NOTHING to bring its measures into compliance, in which case there is a 20-day 
deadline to request countermeasures, and (b) that Article 21.5 deals with the situation  4
where the losing party does SOMETHING to bring its measures into compliance and 
there is disagreement as to the adequacy of that reform, in which case the 20-day 
period to request countermeasures starts at the end of the Article 21.5 (Panel or 
Appellate Body) proceedings if the finding is against the respondent. With this 
interpretation there is no dilemma in law: the compliance Panel’s mandate under 
Article 21.5 is simply to decide if the reform is adequate. If so, end of story; if not, the 
complaining party can request countermeasures.   
Even this second interpretation leaves open the possibility for a respondent to 
make an endless series of inadequate reforms – although the retaliatory measures 
would remain in place until the complainant or a Panel is satisfied with the reform. 
Clearly that possibility of very prolonged resolution could be tightened up through a 
re-drafting of the procedural rules when the DSU is reviewed.
3 The problem is now 
well recognized by the WTO membership, and suggestions for remedial action have 
been forthcoming.
4 Hence attention now turns to the economic features of 
compensation and retaliation in cases where a policy measure has been found to be 
still WTO-inconsistent.  
 
2. Why is compensation not preferred to retaliation? 
A complainant unhappy with the respondent’s policy reform is entitled to seek 
compensation until satisfactory reforms are implemented. If that compensation comes 
                                                           
3 The various aspects of the sequencing problem that need to be reviewed, and the approaches adopted 
in the interim by other Panels, are laid out by two Canadian officials in Valles and McGiven (2000). For 
discussions by other trade law professors of how the WTO Panel and Arbitrator handled this dilemma 
in the case involving the EC banana import regime, see Salas and Jackson (2000), Bhala (2000) and 
Komura (2000). 
4 Mavroidis (2000, page 799), for example, suggests three points for consideration by the DSU review: 
that a request for countermeasures can be examined only if a compliance panel has previously 
pronounced the implementing action inadequate; that the compliance panel decision is final (not 
appealable); and that respondents have only one ‘reasonable period of time’ to bring their measures into 
compliance with their WTO obligations.  5
in the form of a temporary lowering of the respondent’s import barriers on some other 
products, the changes must be consistent with existing agreements. In particular, they 
must be offered on a most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis.  
In pure economic terms, compensation in this form is simply trade 
liberalization. That boosts economic welfare in the respondent country, in the 
complainant country, and even in third countries that export the products whose 
import barriers have been lowered. Even if some third countries that import those or 
like products were to lose from a terms of trade deterioration, we know from standard 
gains-from-trade theory that the world as a whole will be better off economically. 
Why, then, is compensation rarely preferred to retaliation, when the latter 
typically involves the complainant raising its import barriers on products exported by 
the respondent and thereby harming economic welfare in both countries and globally? 
The answer has at least three parts. First, for reasons discussed in the previous 
section, the current procedures do not guarantee a timely arbitration decision on the 
extent of compensation that is warranted. Hopefully that will not be an issue if/when 
the procedural rules in Articles 21.5 and 22.6 of the DSU are amended following the 
review currently under way.  
Second, the MFN feature of compensation means third countries also could 
export more to the respondent, so the complainant would require a larger degree of 
access than if access were able to be provided on a preferential basis. Even though that 
greater openness would improve economic welfare for the respondent country, the 
political economy of trade policy is such that the political leadership of the country  6
would lose from such unilateral reform – otherwise it would not have those import 
barriers there in the first place (Grossman and Helpman 1994).
5  
And third, if compensation were to be granted, the respondent would gain 
greater control of procedures. Specifically, since the compensation is voluntary (DSU 
Article 22.1), the respondent can end it once the offending policy is further reformed, 
pending the protracted outcome of any further action by the complainant under DSU 
Article 21.5. With retaliation, by contrast, the complainant can keep that pressure on 
the respondent until the latter satisfies an Article 21.5 Panel that the proposed 
replacement if the offending policy is WTO-consistent and the new measure has been 
implemented satisfactorily. 
This is not to say that retaliation is desirable from the complainant’s 
viewpoint. On the contrary, it is a last-resort action with peculiar economic features, 
five of which are considered below. 
 
3. Five features of the economics of trade retaliation 
 
(a) The concept of equivalence  
As noted above, DSU Article 22.7 requires the Arbitrator to determine whether 
the level of retaliation for which authorization is being sought is ‘equivalent’ to the 
damage caused by the WTO-inconsistent measure. The type of retaliation most 
commonly considered involves the complainant listing a range of products it imports 
                                                           
5 The fact that bilateral and multilateral agreements to lower import barriers are reached does not 
contradict the fact that governments are unwilling to liberalize unilaterally. Those agreements can be 
seen as a form of political gain from exchange in market access: Country A allows more of B’s exports 
into A’s market on the condition that B allows sufficiently greater access to its market for A’s exports 
that the leadership in each country gains at least as much extra political support from its exporters (and 
consumers) as it loses from its import-competing producers who are exposed to greater competition 
from abroad (Grossman and Helpman 1995; Hillman and Moser 1995).  7
from the respondent on which it will impose prohibitively high tariffs until the 
respondent’s offending measures are brought into conformity. The gross value of the 
imports to be prohibited, typically the average for the three most recent representative 
years for which import data are available, should match the value of the complainant’s 
imports excluded by the respondent’s WTO-inconsistent measure. That is probably 
the simplest way of quantifying the on-going damage to the complainant from the 
WTO-inconsistent part of the respondent’s policy measure when that measure is an 
excessive import restriction.  
However, it needs to be recognized that ensuring equivalence between the 
damage and the retaliation in terms of the gross value of trade between the respondent 
and the complainant does not mean that retaliation has the same economic welfare 
effect on the respondent as the initial damage is having on the complainant. The 
bilateral trade value necessarily exaggerates the negative effect on both parties’ 
economic welfare, but it does not do so equally (except by coincidence).  
To see this, consider the case of retaliation depicted in Figure 1. Suppose Dc is 
the complainant’s import demand curve for a product imported from the respondent, 
and Dw is the world’s import demand for it. If Sr is the respondent’s excess supply 
curve for that product, then in the absence of distortions and assuming perfect 
competition, the international price of the product will be P and the quantity traded 
will by Qw, of which Qc goes to the complainant. A prohibitive tariff which reduces Qc 
to zero will cause the global demand for the respondent’s exported product to shrink 
to Dw’. This horizontal shift will be by less than the full extent of Dc because the 
complainant will demand more close substitutes in the world market, driving up their 
price and hence shifting out to some extent the demand curve of the rest of the world 
for the respondent’s export product. The international price of that product will fall to  8
P’ and the volume of the respondent’s exports will fall from Qw to Qw’, that is, by less 
than OQc. The gross value of the imports to be prohibited is the area PbQcO, whereas 
the respondent’s net loss of export earnings from this product is the smaller area 
PeQwQw’dP’. Meanwhile, the respondent’s economic welfare loss because of that 
trade prohibition is just area PedP’, since the area under the respondent’s export 
supply curve between points d and e represents costs of production which would not 
be borne if the respondent’s export volume was reduced by Qw’Qw.  
The economic welfare loss to the respondent is larger absolutely, and relative 
to the gross value of trade curtailed, the steeper (i.e., the less price elastic) is Sr, the 
respondent’s export supply curve, between the free market equilibrium point e and the 
constrained equilibrium point d. Hence the ratio of PedP’ to PbQcO would vary across 
products. This underscores the point that ensuring the reduction in the value of 
imports from the respondent, due to retaliation, matches the reduction in the value of 
imports from the complainant, due to the WTO-inconsistent measure being used by 
the respondent, will not be (except by coincidence) the same as ensuring equivalent 
losses in economic welfare for the other party due to the import restriction each is 
imposing. 
 Moreover, this retaliation is not costless to the complainant: it loses area abP 
in Figure 1 from choosing to forego purchasing those import products from the 
respondent. That economic welfare cost is smaller the flatter (or more price elastic, 
e.g. because of the availability of close substitutes) is Dc, the complainant’s import 
demand curve for the respondent’s export product, to the left of b. It is also offset 
somewhat by the gains from trading more with suppliers of close substitutes to the 
respondent’s products (not shown in Figure 1) – although that necessarily is smaller  9
than area abP, for otherwise the complainant would have been purchasing from those 
other supplying countries in the first place.  
Although political sensitivity is likely to be the main criterion for selecting 
products to target, the net economic cost of retaliating to the complainant relative to 
the respondent would be lower the lower the listed products’ export supply elasticity 
between e and d and the higher the complainant’s import demand elasticity between a 
and b, ceteris paribus. That is, there is scope for the complainant to minimize its 
economic welfare loss from retaliating, just as there is scope for the respondent to 
mitigate its lost sales through diverting them to other countries.
6  
For all these reasons, trade loss equivalence would never translate into 
equivalent damage to economic welfare, except by coincidence – and necessarily the 
complainant will in addition lose economically during the retaliation period from the 
import restrictions it imposes on the respondent’s trade. 
More fundamentally, why does the DSU seek ‘equivalence’ anyway? On the 
one hand, the idea of legitimizing retaliation is contrary to the objective of reducing 
impediments to trade. On the other hand, if the purpose of the retaliation is to induce 
swift WTO compliance from the respondent, then perhaps some multiple of the 
damage is the optimal level of retaliation to impose. Even the possibility that some 
multiple of the damage might be authorized would reduce the tendency for members 
to persist with WTO-inconsistent policies.  
 
(b) The inherent injustice of retaliation 
 
                                                           
6 Indeed the empirical evidence on past attempts to impose sanctions suggests the availability of close 
substitutes and the scope for circumvention mean such trade bans have much less economic impact than 
the gross value of trade might lead one to expect (see Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott 1990).  10
Presumably the equivalence concept draws on notions of fairness (with 
parallels in centuries-old international conventions on military wars), especially since 
large economies have more scope to use this procedure effectively than smaller 
economies. But that notion is violated under WTO retaliation rules in at least four 
respects. First, past wrongs go uncompensated. That is, trade retaliation under WTO 
only targets non-compliance after the ‘reasonable period of time’ has elapsed 
following a Panel or Appelate Body finding against a respondent’s policy regime. The 
damage done in preceding years to the complainant’s export industry is simply 
ignored by DSU procedures. 
Second, when the remedy chosen is a withdrawal of concessions by the 
complainant towards the respondent’s exports, the complainant’s economy is not 
helped but harmed by retaliation (the standard cost of protectionist barriers). For small 
or developing economies confronting a much larger trader, that may well deter them 
from seeking recourse through the DSU or, should the Arbitrator rule in their favour, 
from adopting retaliatory measures (as was the case with Ecuador following the 
decision reported in WTO (2000)).
7 
Third, retaliation does nothing to help the export industry that has been denied 
market access by the respondent in the first place.
8 Rather, it is the complainant’s 
import-competing industries that enjoy temporary assistance because of the 
prohibitive retaliatory tariffs imposed.  
And fourth, the respondent’s industries that are harmed by the complainant’s 
retaliatory measures typically are not the industries that have been benefiting from the 
WTO-inconsistent measure. Rather, they are the ones chosen by the complainant 
                                                           
7 This is not to say that small countries would be better off without a multilateral dispute settlement 
process of course. On the contrary, Maggi (2001) provides a clear analysis of why bilateral agreements  11
typically with a view to having the largest negative political impact on the respondent 
government. 
 
(c) The choice of counterfactual to the present regime 
To measure the export damage, the present WTO-inconsistent import policy 
regime needs to be compared with what it would be like once amended to become 
WTO-consistent. This raises the obvious difficulty that many alternative policy 
measures, including even-more trade restrictive ones, could be WTO-consistent. The 
respondent is unlikely to be helpful in suggesting what the alternatives might be, for 
one or other of them – including free trade -- would have been implemented already if 
they were not so unattractive politically. That leaves the complainant with the task of 
proposing some counterfactual possibilities and estimating the damage under those 
various scenarios. The estimated damage is considered to be the difference in the 
value of the imports of this product set under the counterfactual regime(s) as 
compared with under the present WTO-inconsistent regime.
9 
 
(d) The breadth of coverage 
Only direct exports from the complainant to the respondent of the product(s) 
concerned should count. Indirect exports of the complainant’s produce embodied in 
the final-good exports from another WTO member to the respondent are the concern 
of that third country – otherwise, its third party rights would be violated (or, 
alternatively, there would be double counting of a portion of the damage to that third 
                                                                                                                                                                      
would be inferior from the viewpoint of small countries. 
8 This point was made as long ago as the 18
th century by Adam Smith (1776, Book IV, Chapter II). 
9 For a clear description of how such a calculation is made, see the report of the Arbitrator in the case of 
the EC-US beef hormone case (WTO 1999b).  12
country’s exports).
10 If the product concerned is a service attached to goods from 
another country, then the complainant’s trade would be measured at most from the 
f.o.b. point of that third country. It may go beyond the c.i.f. point in the respondent 
country, however, if some of those services exports are achieved by commercial 
presence in that country (as with the United States in wholesale banana markets within 
the EC – see WTO 1999a). For the sake of equivalence, comparable points in the 
marketing chain also should be used for measuring the trade flow to be prohibited on 
the retaliation side. 
 
(e) The limitations on cross-retaliation 
Another feature of economic and political significance in the retaliation 
procedures has to do with DSU Article 22.3. That Article states that the complainant 
should retaliate in the same sector wherever practicable. For example, retaliation 
against a goods violation should be in goods. In the case of retaliation against a 
services or TRIPs violation, however, DSU Article 22.3(f) is even more precise. There 
are 11 services categories and 9 TRIPs categories separately identified, and the 
retaliation should where practicable match the services or TRIPs category of the 
violation. Where there are multiple violations in more than one category, the 
retaliation is expected to be in the same categories in similar proportion. 
From an economic viewpoint this raises two puzzles. First, why are services or 
TRIPs so finely subdivided when their trade importance is so much less than goods, 
which are treated as a single category?  
                                                           
10 Cases in point are the EC banana import regime arbitrations, whereby Ecuador was considered able 
to retaliate for loss of goods trade in the total value of bananas up to the f.o.b point while the United 
States was not considered able to retaliate for loss of, say, fertilizer trade to Ecuador even though that 
fertilizer may have been used in producing Ecuadorian bananas that could have been sold to the EC. 
See WTO (1999a, para. 6.12) and WTO (2000).   13
And second, why not allow the possibility of cross-retaliation so as to 
maximize the opportunity to encourage policy reform by the respondent, and to 
minimize the limitation that within-sector retaliation poses where the economies of 
the two parties are vastly different in size?  
While there are strict conditions attached to cross-retaliation, that possibility is 
not completely ruled out. The conditions under which it is allowed are laid out in DSU 
Article 22.3. And already it has been used: in the case of the EC banana import 
regime, it was recognized by the Arbitrator that Ecuador imported too few goods from 
the EC to be able to retaliate in just goods, or even goods plus services, and so a 
suspension of concessions relating to TRIPS was allowed
11 (WTO 2000). 
 
4. Implications of globalization for trade dispute settlement 
Globalization includes the phenomenon of economic integration resulting from 
the fall in transactions costs of doing business across space, including across national 
borders. The fall in barriers to trade in goods, services, financial capital and ideas has 
been a consequence of declining transport and communications costs, most recently 
because of the digital revolution, as well as trade and other regulatory reforms (see 
WTO 1998; World Bank 1999). One consequence is that services and ideas are 
growing in relative importance in the world economy and in global trade (see World 
Bank 1998).  
This phenomenon is making the measurement of trade damage and hence 
equivalent trade retaliation more complicated for the WTO compared with its GATT 
predecessor when only goods were of significance. Even discerning a nation’s 
                                                           
11 Mavroidis (2000, page 804) points out that it is not clear from DSU Article 22.3 whether the 
Arbitrator needed to be so intrusive or could have left it to the complainant to decide where to suspend  14
economic interest in a dispute can become difficult now that services and TRIPs are 
involved. For example, a country may have its services exports curtailed by another 
country’s WTO-inconsistent policy measure in a way that restricts a third country’s 
exports of goods to which those services are added, in which case the f.o.b. export 
price an volume of that good fall.  
A further complication arises if a country is an importer of a good, but a 
supplier of services to the export of that good to third countries. As was true for the 
United States in the EC banana import case, US economic welfare has been enhanced 
by the lower international price of Latin American bananas, even though EC policies 
have reduced US banana services exports that might have been attached to Latin 
American banana sales to the EC.  
Two other aspects of the spread of globalization also are relevant. One is the 
growth of multinational corporations (MNCs); the other is the related disaggregation 
of production into ever-more footloose intermediate production processes. 
WTO trade dispute settlement procedures cause a problem for MNCs to the 
extent that the share of their production outside their home country dominates and the 
number of countries in which they produce a particular product grows. This stems 
from the WTO convention that a product is considered to be exported solely from the 
country of final transformation, as defined by the World Customs Organization’s 
classification. If the export-oriented production of an MNC is outside its home 
country, then the host country’s government needs to defend it in the WTO. If there 
                                                                                                                                                                      
concessions.  15
are many such host countries, there is likely to be less interest taken by any one of 
them.
12 
Globalization and the growth of MNCs also is generating an ever-finer 
fragmentation of production processes that seek out the ever-changing lowest cost 
locations globally. A growing share of the intermediate inputs and value added by 
those plants is sourced from abroad (Feenstra 1998). Hence even if a product 
undergoes sufficient transformation to alter its customs classification, the vast 
majority of its value could be due to the productive activities of another country. The 
convention that the host country has 100 per cent of the right to retaliate against 
another country’s WTO-inconsistent policy while the input-supplying country has no 
right to retaliate is looking increasingly inappropriate as this aspect of globalization 
proceeds.  
 
5. Scope for reforming the DSU 
  The most obvious implication to come out of WTO arbitration so far is the 
need to tighten current procedural rules in Articles 21.5 and 22 of the DSU. The 
problem is now well recognized and alternative procedures are under consideration. 
Even with those sequencing uncertainties removed, however, it is unlikely that 
compensation will be preferred to the economically less efficient temporary measure 
of retaliation to entice a respondent to bring its trade regime into line with WTO 
obligations, for the political economy reasons mentioned in section 2. 
  The economic purist might wonder why the value of imports curtailed, rather 
than a valuation of the national economic welfare consequences of the import barriers, 
                                                           
12 In principle, there is also the possibility that the interests of a MNC from a non-WTO member 
country could be defended by a host country that is a WTO member. In practice, however, this is  16
is used to determine equivalence in retaliation to nullification or impairment. The 
reason probably has much less to do with an understanding of economics than with the 
relative simplicity of the traditional concept of trade equivalence.  
Meanwhile, the ethicist might wonder why the present peculiar concept of 
equivalence is adhered to during the dispute settlement period. One reason to question 
it is that a greater dose of retaliation could speed the process of becoming compliant – 
the apparent objective of the drafters of the DSU.
13  
A second equity concern is that retaliation does not help the complainant’s 
exporters who have been and continue to be harmed, nor are the respondent’s 
industries harmed by the retaliation the same ones that have been helped by the WTO-
inconsistent measure. Monetary compensation to the complainant from the respondent 
may offer more scope for governments to target the transfers to achieve a more-
equitable outcome (and in the process to capture at least the full historical cost of the 
WTO-inconsistent measure to the complainant, if not also to add a punitive element). 
And a third equity concern is that small complainants are not as able as large 
ones to inflict damage on large respondents. For that reason Horn and Mavroidis 
(1999, page 22) suggest consideration be given to the notion that the rest of the WTO 
membership contribute to the cost of small countries taking retaliatory action, so as to 
reduce the risk of large traders remaining WTO-inconsistent. This is part of the bigger 
issue of technical and financial assistance for developing countries to participate in the 
DSU more broadly, and indeed in all of the WTO’s activities. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
becoming less and less relevant as the WTO membership expands: as of early 2002, all but 5 per cent of 
global trade emanates from WTO members. 
13 Note that the Panel considering the EC banana import regime case could not find anything in Article 
22 of the DSU to justify punitive retaliation (WTO 1999a). But note also that the International Law 
Commission’s Draft of 16 July 1996 on State Responsibility does not consider compensation for 
damage already incurred from an illegal activity as punitive (Horn and Mavroidis 1999, page 5).  17
Finally, with the ever-widening spread of multinational corporations and the 
ever-greater fragmentation of production as globalization proceeds, national 
governments are gradually becoming less appropriate bodies to defend the interests of 
multinational corporations. Will the day come when firms will be allowed to defend 
their trade interests directly at the WTO? Meanwhile, such firms are likely to come 
under increasing pressure to supplement the taxpayers’ money needed to cover the 
complainant’s cost of dispute settlement activities that involve their pecuniary 
interests – especially if, as was possibly the case in the US complaint against the EC 
banana regime (Bhala 2000, pp. 968-70), national welfare in the complainant’s 
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